We describe experimental work on cryptographic protection of databases and software. The database in our experiment is a natural language dictionary of over 4000 Spanish verbs. Our tentative conclusion is that the overhead cost of computing with encrypted data is fairly small.
Introduction
It is often desirable to allow a user to access a database D via some program P while preventing her from obtaining a copy of the entire contents of the database. For example, let D be a table of pairs (l i ; r i ), 1 i n, where each l i is the name of a person and P(l i ; D) = r i is the phone number of l i . A typical user of D should be able to obtain the number r i if she knows l i but should not be able to obtain the names and numbers of the people she does not know.
More formally, given a database D and program P that accesses it, we wish to construct an encrypted database D 0 and a corresponding program P 0 with the following properties.
For any query q, P(q; D) = P 0 (q; D 0 ). Given P 0 and D 0 , it is computationally infeasible to reconstruct D.
Various theoretical problems concerning computation with encrypted data have appeared in the cryptologic literature. We mention two of them and then explain how they di er from the problem that we study here. Yao 30] posed the problem of which distributed computation problems have secure multiparty protocols. That is, when is it possible for equally-powerful parties P i , 1 i n, each holding a private input x i , to cooperate in the computation of y = f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) in such a way that each P i learns y and no P i learns anything about x j , j 6 = i, except what is implied by y and x i ? Secure multiparty protocols in which all of the parties are limited to polynomial-time computation are discussed in 10, 13] . Those in which all of the parties are computationally unlimited are discussed in 3, 4]. Abadi, Feigenbaum, and Kilian 1] posed the problem of which functions have instancehiding schemes. In their scenario, one party, say P 0 , has a private input x, but lacks the computational resources to compute f. Party P 1 has the power to compute f but cannot guarantee the privacy of inputs it receives. For which functions f can P 0 cooperate with P 1 to obtain f(x) without revealing x? Instance-hiding schemes in which P 0 cooperates with multiple powerful parties P 1 , : : :, P m are discussed in 2].
In this paper, we take an experimental approach to computing with encrypted data, and we set a more modest goal than that of the previous authors. We wish to allow users to learn the answers P(q; D) to speci c queries q, but we wish to make it di cult for them to incorporate the entire database D into another program of their own design. We do this by providing only an encrypted database D 0 . The \information content" of D is certainly present in D 0 , but we can make it di cult to extract by using a good encryption function. Note that access to D 0 via the program P 0 does allow a user to recover the input-output relation of P by computing P 0 (q; D 0 ) for all possible queries q. This does not mean that we have not gained anything in encrypting D. First, the value of D may be in the way it is structured, not in the \raw data" that it contains; indeed, the raw data of the input-output relation is often publicly available and is, in fact, the starting point for both the database designer and the potential thief. If the user were willing to structure D from the raw data, then he would not need D 0 at all. Second, the set of all syntactically valid queries is usually a proper superset of the set of queries that yield meaningful output, and it may be far too large to generate by exhaustive search.
The natural language software that we seek to protect is a good example of leaky technology, as de ned by Ouchi 27] . Once developed and sold by one vendor, it can easily be modi ed and resold by someone who has not borne any of the development costs. Traditional patent and copyright laws may not be applicable, and litigation is a costly and cumberson source of protection in any case. Ouchi suggests joint research and development by large companies all of whom stand to gain from the advancement of a leaky technology. Clearly a technical solution to the problem of leakage would be more satisfying and, in the software industry, where there are many potential vendors most of whom have no research and development e orts, it may be the only possible type of solution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a method of encrypting table-structured databases such as the phone database described above. Section 3 gives the structure of the natural language databases that we seek to protect and describes our experiment with the Spanish-verb dictionary. Finally, Section Let Enc and Dec be encryption and decryption functions such that, for all x and k, Dec(Enc(x; k); k) = x. Then the encrypted database D 0 is derived from D as follows: for every (l i ; r i ) pair in D, a pair (h(l i ); Enc(r i ; l i )) is inserted into D 0 . The modi ed lookup program P 0 uses the algorithm:
This table-encryption scheme is an enhancement of a standard password-storage technique rst developed by Needham (see Denning's book 7, Section 3.6] for a thorough discussion). Normally such a scheme is used only when jLj is too large for h to be inverted by brute force and L in is a subset that is infeasible to generate.
3 An Application to Dictionaries 3.1 Why Natural Languages?
Natural-language dictionaries as used by computer programs are good candidates for the kind of protection discussed in this paper. Information about the form and usage of words is not inherently secret { thus the fact that conozcamos is the rst person plural present subjunctive form of the Spanish verb conocer (to know) is public knowledge. Such facts can certainly not be patented, and copyright can only protect the form of their expression, which can easily be changed without altering the content. Nevertheless, a signi cant investment of skilled labor goes into arranging such facts for computer applications { for instance, it takes a good fraction of a year's work to create a database that correctly relates all possible Spanish orthographic forms with their dictionary head-words and in ectional categories.
There are many other types of information that might be contained in such linguistic databases: the pronunciation of English words, the relation between words and probability distributions over grammatical categories, the relation between Japanese and English terms of art in Electrical Engineering, and so forth. These databases may have hundreds of thousands or even millions of entries, which usually have to be created or checked by human labor. For convenience in exposition, we will use the word \dictionary" to mean natural language databases that require skilled labor and linguistic knowledge to design and assemble from the raw data.
Anyone who creates software that includes such a dictionary must face the fact that its information content is likely to be stolen, if it is not somehow protected. That is, dictionary software is leaky. Our aim in this section is to present a general method for protecting dictionaries, along with an experimental implementation.
Structuring and Storing the Cleartext Dictionary
Sometimes a dictionary is naturally expressed as a simple key-value table, and in this case, the method sketched in Section 2 can be applied directly. Often, however, the forms to which the dictionary applies arise from the rule-governed combination of parts, and the resulting relation may be large enough that we would rather generate it on-line than store it. Thus regular plural and possessive forms in English would triple the size of the noun list in a pronouncing dictionary, but can be derived in a simple way from the singular forms. For each Spanish verb stem, regular in ection and the attachment of enclitic pronouns can produce almost 100 forms. In some cases, such as the treatment of compound words in German, the full table is not bounded in any non-arbitrary way, and a decomposition in terms of simpler parts is forced.
One simple but useful way to treat such computations is as transductions, that is, n-ary word relations de nable by the component-wise concatenation of n-tuple labels along paths in a nite directed labeled graph. 1 De ne an n-ary nondeterministic nite automaton as a 5-tuple A = (Q; q 1 ; F; ; H) where Q is a nite non-empty set of states, q 1 is a designated start state, F is a set of designated nal states, is a nite non-empty alphabet, and H is a nite subset of fQ ( ) n Qg, where ( ) n is the set of n-tuples of (possibly empty) words over . Thus A de nes a labeled directed graph, whose nodes are elements of Q, and whose edges are elements of H. Each edge is labeled with an n-tuple of (possibly empty) words. The component-wise concatenation of labels along every path that begins in q 1 and ends in an element of F de nes a set of n-tuples, R ( ) n , which is the relation transduced by A.
The information content of most dictionaries (in the sense in which we are using that term) can be comfortably expressed by such a graph. 2 In order to use the dictionary, we need to run a program that searches this graph in order to nd all the n-tuples in R meeting some condition, say those for which the \spelling" component of the relation is the string w. Figure 1 shows a sample graph, labelled by pairs of strings, which expresses the regular aspects of Spanish verb in ection. 
A Program for Accessing the Cleartext Dictionary
The lookup program P searches the graph represented by such an arc le for all paths consistent with a given input string; that is, for all paths such that the input string matches the concatenation of InStrings along the path. Obviously, the labeling of tuple components as input and output is arbitrary { the same arclist can be used for computations in either direction. In the Spanish verb dictionary described in Section 3.5 below, this means that the same graph can be used to map verbs to morphological descriptions (e.g., conozcamos to rst person plural present subjunctive of conocer) and to map morphological descriptions to verbs (e.g., rst person plural present subjunctive of conocer to conozcamos); for the rst mapping, we search the graph in one direction, and for the second, we search it in the opposite direction.
A recursive algorithm for P running on a given user input w is shown below. It assumes a function find(D; OriginState; InString) that returns the (possibly null) list of (DestinationState; OutString) pairs from all the arcs in D with that OriginState and InString. The notation string1 -string2, where string2 is an initial substring of string1, denotes the remaining characters of string1 if string2 is removed from its beginning. The notation string1 + string2, where string1 and string2 are arbitrary strings, denotes concatenation. NULL whether its input string is a valid DestinationState-OutString concatenation, returns the separated DestinationState and OutString if valid, and returns FALSE if its input is not valid. 3 As before, string1 -string2 denotes the remaining characters of string1 after removing string2 from the beginning, string1 + string2 denotes concatenation, and NULL denotes the null string. As noted in Section 1, the complete input/output relation of a program accessing the database does not always provide enough information to reconstruct the database. In the case of an automaton simulator, for example, reconstructing the sequential transducer would require an exhaustive search of the space of possible origin-instring pairs.
Our Implementation and the Spanish-verb Analyzer
In the implementation described in this section, the hash function hash(x) was a modied version of the hash function used by the UNIX spelling checker spell 23]. For the encryption-decryption pair Enc(x; k) and Dec(y; k), a modi cation of Don Mitchell's DES implementation was used.
The programs are called dictionary, datacrypt, and lookup. As a test case, the spanish regular verb analyzer shown in Figure 1 was used. 4 It contains 4417 regular Spanish verbs, and recognizes 48 of the in ected forms of each verb: the in nitive, the present and past participles, the imperatives, the indicative present, imperfect, preterite, future and conditional, and the subjunctive present and imperfect of each verb for all applicable combinations of person and number. The size in bytes of the cleartext arc le and the encrypted les are as follows:
cleartext arc le 94704 encrypted arc le 108682 encrypted reverse arc le 95057
Thus the space overhead for encryption was not very great. Of course, the cleartext arc le is quite redundant, and could be represented much more compactly. Signi cant compression (e.g. by a factor of 3 to 4) could also easily be achieved in the encrypted version, although some techniques (such as those that use shared structure) would not work, and it would therefore be hard to match the ultimate level of compression achievable in the clear. Still, the size of dictionary databases encrypted by this method would be acceptable for many applications.
We implemented both P and P 0 , as described above, in C, aiming more at clarity and simplicity than at optimal performance. Our implementation of the P algorithm runs about twice as fast as our implementation of the P 0 algorithm, which nevertheless is able to process more than 100 words per second on a 10-MIP machine. The P 0 implementation spends a good deal of its time on a rather ine cient conversion of character strings into DES keys, and caching of previously-obtained results would give a big performance boost given the usual Zipf's-law distribution of input forms. Even without any tuning, however, the performance is acceptable for many applications.
We should note that there are some e cient implementation techniques that would not be usable with this approach to database protection. An example is the use of a letter trie 4 Conclusion and Open Questions Our tentative conclusion is that it is feasible, both in terms of storage-space overhead and in terms of running-time overhead, to compute with encrypted versions of natural-language databases encoded as automata. Two types of open questions remain and invite further work.
First, there are open questions about our implementation. How close to one-way is the spell hash function? Our software can be modi ed easily to use any hash function that is fast enough to render the resulting lookup program practical. In our implementation of lookup, the following \false" matches are detected: h(OriginState + InString), for some invalid available substring, matches the key of an entry in the encrypted automaton, but the decrypted value of the same entry is not a valid h(destination ? state + outstring) pair. The applicable notion of \validity" need not require the algorithm to know the set of possible state names, but could (for instance) be determined by a redundancy check character inserted into the decrypted string after the character that delimits the boundary between destination-state and outstring. It seems unlikely, but is obviously not impossible, that an undetectable false match could occur, i.e., an invalid instring choice could cause the automaton to \hit" a valid h(destination ? state + outstring) pair and to continue through an erroneous path of the simulation. Is this really unlikely enough in practice to be ignored? Note that for output actually to be produced in such a case, the nonsensical instring would have to produce false matches along an entire path from start state to nal state.
Next, we mention two open questions about the relationship of this work to more general questions in software protection and software engineering.
If the hashing, encryption, and decryption algorithms used in our scheme are good enough, then a computationally-bounded adversary cannot compute D given P 0 and D 0 . However, a trace of the execution of P 0 on a particular input would allow an adversary to learn one path through the automaton D. To recover the entire automaton, the adversary would have to generate inputs which \cover" all of D. The following observation is due to R. J. Lipton: the consensus in the program-testing community is that \coverage," i.e., generating a set of test inputs that cause every statement in a program to be executed, is very hard to achieve. Is it possible to formalize the apparent \reduction" from coverage to decryption? That is, can we say precisely that, to recover D, or even a signi cant portion of it, the adversary would have to generate a covering set of inputs, which appears to be hard in practice? Finally, we draw the reader's attention to the Goldreich software protection model 12]; see also the recent work of Ostrovsky (to appear in 26]; abstract in these proceedings 9]). We do not review the details of the model here, but merely point out that our database protection goal is a special case of the goal of the software vendor in the Goldreich model.
In 12], the end user feeds an encrypted program 0 and a cleartext input x to a computer that contains a nonstandard piece of hardware, called a \cryptographic cpu." The software vendor wants the user not to be able to infer anything signi cant about the original program from the memory-access pattern of the computer running 0 on input x. In our case, the original program is the pair P, D, and the input is the query q. When we feed the encrypted pair P 0 , D 0 to the computer, we do not care whether the user learns P. For the automaton case that we have already implemented, P is just a certain kind of graph search program, which the user could presumably construct on his own, and in general, P is some sort of database lookup program; all of the valuable information is in the encrypted data D 0 . Are there inexpensive versions of the solutions of Goldreich or Ostrovsky that work for the type of programs that we are interested in but may not work in general?
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